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The CISG has been described as one of history 's most successful attempts
to harmonize international commercial law. Consistent with its goal of
harmonizing the law of international sales, Article 7(1) of the CISG
instructs courts and arbitrators to interpret the Convention in light of "its
international character and the need to promote uniformity in its
application. " MCC-Marble v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostina is a U.S.
decision that has been praised for its adherence to Article 7(1). In contrast
with conventional academic commentary, which praises MCC-Marble and
criticizes the tendency of courts to interpret the CISG in light of their
respective domestic legal traditions (the "homeward trend'), this Essay
critiques MCC-Marble as a decision that emphasizes uniformity at the
expense of other important considerations. Notwithstanding Article 7(1),
uniformity was not the exclusive goal of the CISG project. Although it may
result in some inconsistency in the Convention's implementation, the
homeward trend also should enhance the CISG's legitimacy and
acceptability over the long term. MCC-Marble is examined to illustrate how
its interpretative approach to the CISG's provisions regarding parol
evidence may exacerbate the tendency of US. parties to opt out of the
CISG. This Essay argues for an interpretation of the CISG that allows
greater weight to be afforded the terms of a final written agreement.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods'
has been described as one of history's most successful attempts to harmonize
international commercial law.2 Negotiated over a period of decades, the
CISG finally entered into force in 1988 and since that time has been adopted
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, email: 7cross@jmls.edu. The author
wishes to thank research assistants Kristen Hudson, Dennis Foldenauer, and Alisha
Taylor, and also Jirgen Kesper for translating the German cases cited herein.
1 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1980-United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/1980CISG.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CISG].
2 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation
Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1996) ("It
can be said with little risk of overstatement that the [CISG] represents one of history's
most successful efforts at the unification of the law governing international
transactions.").
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by over sixty-five countries. 3 In addition to its widespread applicability, the
CISG has generated voluminous scholarly commentary, the creation of
websites that collect, translate, and index related decisions,4 and even a
special moot that currently attracts about a thousand law students to Vienna
each year.5
Yet since its inception, the Convention's goal of uniformity has been
undermined by its uneven implementation in the states that have ratified it.
While the courts of CISG signatory countries, particularly Germany, have
interpreted and applied the CISG in thousands of cases, 6 there are still
relatively few such cases decided by United States courts.7 While the
relatively low number of CISG cases litigated in U.S. courts may be
explained by a number of factors, such as the prevalence of arbitration, or the
possibility that the applicability of the CISG is unknown or ignored by U.S.
3 Counting Paraguay and El Salvador, where the Convention will go into force in
February 2007 and December 2007, respectively, UNCITRAL's website currently lists
sixty-nine parties to the CISG. See supra note 1. However, to date, the CISG has not been
adopted by a number of important trading countries, most notably Japan and the United
Kingdom.
4 See, e.g., Institute of International Commercial Law at Pace Law School,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); UNCITRAL's Database of
Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/caselaw.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); CISG-
Online Database, available at http://www.cisg-online.ch (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); and
UNILEX CISG Database, available at
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cftn?dssid=2376&dsmid=14315 (last visited Jan. 26,
2007).
5 The stated purpose of the Vis Competition is to promote the understanding of
international commercial law and arbitration through its application to a concrete fact
pattern. Pace University School of Law, The Annual Willem C. Vis International
Commercial Arbitration Moot, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/vis.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007). For a recent account of the competition, see Mark R. Shulman,
Moot Court Diplomacy, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Apr. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/14/opinion/edshulman.php (last visited Jan. 26,
2007).
6 The Pace University School of Law's website alone provides access to over 1700
decisions and 5000 case abstracts. See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/case-
annotations.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). Although some of these decisions are
arbitral awards, most are judicial decisions.
7 A search of the term "CISG" in the "allcases" database of Westlaw on February
18, 2006, yielded forty-eight decisions, some of which are appeals of lower court
decisions, and most of which address the CISG only in passing. In other words, for each
year since the CISG came into force, U.S. courts have issued on average fewer than three
decisions that so much as mention the CISG. On the other hand, two-thirds (thirty-two
out of forty-eight) of these decisions were issued in the past five years, which suggests




courts resolving transnational contractual disputes, another likely factor is
that U.S. parties engaged in such disputes (or their attorneys) choose to opt
out of the CISG.
Article 6 of the CISG allows parties to exclude applicability of the
Convention or to derogate from any of its provisions. Although there is no
empirical evidence on this issue, anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S.
parties to transnational sales contracts routinely opt out of the CISG.8 One
need only go to http://www.findlaw.com to encounter international sales
contracts containing CISG opt-out clauses. A typical example is the
following clause from an international sales agreement between 3Com
Corporation and Sonic Systems, Inc.: "The Parties exclude in its entirety the
application to this Agreement of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods." 9
Steven Walt attributes the tendency of U.S. parties to opt out of the CISG
to a collective action problem resulting from the "novelty" of the
Convention. Novelty occurs when a uniform law (such as the CISG) contains
new rules that are distinct from national rules. 10 The uncertainty generated by
these new rules hinders the ultimate success of the uniform law, since, as
Walt explains, "[l]acking information upon which to base reliable estimates
about prospective outcomes under the law, transactors might avoid
application of the [law]."'1I Walt concludes that resort to domestic law
principles, both with respect to filling gaps in the Convention and
interpreting ambiguous language, should limit the uncertainty generated by
8 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
International Sales Law, 25 INT'L. REV. OF L. & EcON. 446, 477-78 (citing anecdotal
evidence from conversations with international transactional attorneys suggesting that "a
substantial amount of opting out occurs"); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform
Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 687-88 (1999) ("Only the hapless tend to have their
contracts governed by the CISG."); Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common
Law Jurisdictions, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 217, 227 (2001) (observing that U.S.
attorneys "frequently" advise clients to opt out of the CISG); Anthony S. Winer, The
CISG Convention and Thomas Franck's Theory of Legitimacy, 19 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
1, 44 n.267 (listing articles that advise practitioners to opt out of the CISG).
9 OEM Purchase and Development Agreement between 3Corn Corporation and
Sonic Systems, Inc. art. 23.9, available at
http://contracts.corporate.fmdlaw.com/agreements/sonicwall/3com.oem. 1999.07.01 .html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007); see also AMD Saxonia Wafer Purchase Agreement between
AMD Saxony Holding GmbH and AMD Saxony Manufacturing GmbH, art. 7.09,
available at
http://contracts.corporate.fmdlaw.com/agreements/amd/saxonia.wafer. 1997.03.11 .html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (showing a contract between two German subsidiaries of a
U.S. corporation, containing a CISG opt-out clause).
10 Walt, supra note 8, at 672-73.
1l Id.
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novelty, and therefore enhance the likelihood that parties ultimately will
utilize the Convention.12
Resort to domestic law principles, however, is at odds with the ultimate
goal of the Convention, which is to unify international sales law. Article 7(1)
of the CISG instructs courts and arbitrators to interpret the Convention in
light of "its international character and the need to promote uniformity in its
application." Relying on Article 7(1), CISG scholars exhort courts and
arbitrators to adopt an autonomous perspective, rather than interpret the
Convention's terms by resorting to analogous domestic law principles.' 3 The
imperative to promote uniformity in interpreting the Convention has long
been a mantra of CISG scholars. 14 At the same time, they disparagingly
observe a tendency of courts, when interpreting the Convention, to do so
within this framework of domestic law principles. John Honnold famously
coined the tendency the "homeward trend," suggesting that it is a regrettable
but inevitable consequence of the unification process:
The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals ...
who will be intimately familiar only with their own domestic law. These
tribunals, regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natural tendency to
read the international rules in light of the legal ideas that have been
12 Id. at 698-701. Other scholars have observed that strict adherence to uniform
interpretation of the CiSG may undermine the Convention's legitimacy. See Peter M.
Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts: Uniformity, Adaptability and Adoptability, in
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77, 79 (P. ar~evid & P. Volken eds.
2001) (see infra, Part II); Winer, supra note 8, at 56-57 (suggesting that the CISG's
legitimacy would be enhanced if less emphasis were placed on uniformity in the
interpretation and application of the Convention).
13 See, e.g., PETER SCHLECHTRJEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 10 (2d English ed.
2005) (finding it imperative for interpreters of the CISG to become familiar with uniform
international concepts, and to "understand them as autonomous concepts and to counter
the danger of their being interpreted in the light of the familiar solutions of domestic
law"); C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 74 (1987) (having regard to the "international
character" of the Convention under Article 7(1) "implies the necessity of interpreting its
terms and concepts autonomously, i.e., in the context of the Convention itself and not by
referring to the meaning which might traditionally be attached to them within a particular
domestic law").
14 See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law,
24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 200-01 (1994) (arguing that Article 7(1) requires the
interpreter to read the Convention, "not ... through the lenses of domestic law, but...
against an international background"); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 13;
BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 13.
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imbedded at the core of their intellectual formation. The mind sees what the
mind has means of seeing. 15
Of the relatively few U.S. cases that actually have applied the CISG,
several have followed the homeward trend, utilizing U.S. contract law
principles by analogy to interpret and fill gaps. 16 These decisions have been
harshly criticized by a number of CISG scholars. 17 In contrast, the Eleventh
Circuit's MCC-Marble decision, 18 which relied on international scholarly
commentary to reject applicability of U.S. contract law principles to an
agreement governed by the Convention, is accepted as a "leading" CISG
case 19 and hailed as the "benchmark against which the progress of future
U.S. decisions on the Convention can be measured." 20
15 JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1989)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
16 See, e.g., Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995)
(relying on U.S. contract law principles to conclude that seller's lost profits under CISG
Article 74 should not be calculated to include fixed costs); see also Schmitz-Werke
GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. App'x. 687 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Maryland contract law principles may be utilized to interpret CISG Article 35, or to fill in
gaps with respect to issues on which the Convention is silent).
In discussing the homeward trend, this Essay does not argue in favor of those
decisions that ignore the applicability of the Convention, or that otherwise apply
domestic contract principles in ways that cannot reasonably be reconciled with the text of
the Convention. See, e.g., Beijing Metals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1182 n.9
(5th Cir. 1993) (dismissing, without analysis, buyer's argument that the CISG applied,
instead applying Texas' version of the parol evidence rule).
17 See Eric C. Schneider, Consequential Damages in the International Sale of
Goods: Analysis of Two Decisions, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 615, 616 (1995) (criticizing
the Delchi Carrier Court for its "inability to set aside its own national thinking" and
describing the case as an "unfortunate first decision" on the CISG's rules relating to
consequential damages); Jeffrey R. Hartwig, Schmitz-Werke & Co. v. Rockland
Industries Inc. and the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale
of Goods (CISG): Diffidence and Developing International Legal Norms, 22 J.L. & COM.
77, 78 (2003) (referring to Schmitz-Werke as a "regression in the evolution of U.S.
Convention jurisprudence").
18 MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostina, S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1087 (1999).
19 CISG Advisory Council opinion No. 3, cmt. 2.6 available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
20 Harry M. Fletchner, The UN. Sales Convention (CISG) and MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A.: The Eleventh Circuit
Weighs in on Interpretation, Subjective Intent, Procedural Limits to the Convention's
Scope, and the Parol Evidence Rule, 18 J.L. & COM. 259, 287 (1999).
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This Essay argues that categorical condemnation of the homeward trend
is unwarranted. The homeward trend is a natural consequence of any
unification project and may be unavoidable. More importantly, the language
and drafting history of the Convention suggest that, notwithstanding Article
7(1), uniformity was not the exclusive goal of the CISG project. The
homeward trend may also enhance the legitimacy and acceptability of the
CISG over the long term. In particular, the propensity of U.S. courts to
interpret the Convention in light of domestic legal traditions may ameliorate
the tendency of U.S. parties to opt out of the CISG. These considerations are
illustrated in the context of the MCC-Marble decision, a contract
interpretation case that vividly illustrates the problems generated by
exclusive emphasis on uniform implementation of the CISG. Part II provides
some background to the CISG, describing the history of the Convention so as
to illustrate how competing goals of uniformity and legitimacy are reflected
in it, and contrasting the Convention's approach with the U.S. approach to
the parol evidence rule (PER). Part III describes the MCC-Marble decision
and highlights the dilemma that the decision created for U.S. parties whose
contracts may fall under the Convention. Part IV contrasts MCC-Marble with
a number of German decisions and proposes an interpretation of CISG
Article 8(3) that allows greater weight to be afforded the terms of a final
written agreement.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CISG
A. History
The origins of the CISG can be traced back to 1929, when comparative
law jurist Ernst Rabel presented a report to the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law,2 1 outlining ideas for the unification of the law of
international sales.22 The Institute set up a committee of European scholars to
work on a draft uniform law (the Uniform Law for the International Sale of
21 The institute, today known as UNIDROIT, is an intergovernmental organization
that was originally set up in Rome through the League of Nations but later was
reestablished by international agreement. In addition to preparing the predecessor
agreements to the CISG, UNIDROIT also created the Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, a set of principles that are widely accepted as reflecting
international commercial practice. The most recent version of the Principles was adopted
by UNIDROIT in 2004, and is available online at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htn (last visited Jan. 26, 2007)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
22 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 13, at 1.
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Goods (ULIS), 23 the predecessor to the CISG).24 In part due to the
intervention of World War II, the law was not completed until 1964, and was
never widely adopted beyond Europe.25 However, the ULIS and its
companion convention, the ULF, did provide a natural starting point for
drafting the CISG, which process began not long after the ink was dry on the
ULIS26 and continued until the CISG was presented for signature in 1980.
Half a century elapsed between Professor Rabel's initial proposal in 1929
and the adoption of the CISG in 1980. This fact alone speaks to the
difficulties inherent in harmonizing the law of international sales. More
specifically, the CISG's drafting history reveals that, although the ultimate
goal of the CISG always has been unification, many compromises were made
along the way in order to ensure broad adoption of the Convention by states.
A number of scholars have observed that the many open-ended terms and
ambiguities in the Convention were the result of numerous political
compromises reached during the drafting process. 27 To use uniformity as the
sole interpretive guide would disregard the context within which the
23 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2007) [hereinafter ULIS]. The ULIS was prepared and adopted in conjunction with a
separate convention dealing with contract formation. See Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulf.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2007) [hereinafter ULF].
24 John Honnold, The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague
Convention of 1964, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 326-27 (1965) [hereinafter 1964
Convention].
25 JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 5-6 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HONNOLD 1999
COMMENTARY]. Nine countries ratified or acceded to the ULIS and the ULF, of which
Israel and Gambia were the only non-European countries. United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Status of Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
main.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
26 When the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
held its first session in 1968, "high priority" was given to developing a uniform law on
international sales. As soon as it was clear that the ULIS and the ULF lacked widespread
support, UNCITRAL established a working group to begin development of a new text.
HONNOLD 1999 COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 9.
27 Gerhart, supra note 12, at 82; see also Helen E. Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping
Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 49 (arguing that interpreters should not adopt an
autonomous interpretation of CISG Article 4(a), because to do so would "do violence to
the political compromise embodied" in the article); Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 446-
49 (describing the vague standards and ambiguous language that resulted from
compromises made during the CISG drafting process).
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Convention was negotiated. Therefore, when CISG Article 7(1) instructs
courts and tribunals to interpret the Convention in light of its "international
character," arguably it means more than a strictly autonomous interpretation;
it also means that the interpreter should be sensitive to the compromises that
made adoption of the Convention possible. Examples of these compromises
are described below.
1. Ambiguities and Vagueness
As Robert Scott and Clayton Gillette have noted, "vague standards
pervade the CISG."'28 The concept of reasonableness is utilized in thirty-one
of the Convention's provisions.29 To provide another example, a buyer
receiving non-conforming goods under the CISG is entitled to cancel the
contract only if the nonconformity amounts to a "fundamental" breach,30
which is defined as a breach that results in "such detriment to [buyer] as to
substantially deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract,
unless [seller] did not foresee, and a reasonable person of the same kind in
the same circumstances would not have foreseen, such result."'31 Thus
buyer's right to avoid the contract hinges on the interpretation of several
vague concepts: "substantial" deprivation, "entitled to expect," "reasonable
[seller]" under the circumstances, and forseeability. Finally, Article 8(3),
which is discussed at length below, 32 is itself a vague standard.
It is clear from the Convention's drafting history that many of the vague
and ambiguous terms that ended up in the CISG were the result of deliberate
compromise. Professor Gerhart found that the most litigated issue under the
Convention has been the amount of interest to be awarded with respect to a
damages award. 33 Although the CISG provides that an injured party is
entitled to interest,34 the manner in which interest is to be calculated is not
specified. Gerhart explains that the omission was not an oversight but a
deliberate decision by the drafting parties, as the issue of interest "was an
obvious hot potato," resulting from religious, economic and political
28 Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 474.
29 Id. at 447 (citing Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 687, 751-52 n.267-69 (1998)).
30 CISG, supra note 1, art. 49.
31 CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
32 See infra Part ll.B. Article 8(3) instructs a court or arbitrator to give "due"
consideration to all relevant circumstances surrounding the making of a contract.
33 Gerhart, supra note 12, at 97.
34 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 78, 83.
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differences among the countries that participated in the negotiation of the
Convention.35
Similarly, Article 16(2)(a), which deals with the revocability of offers,
contains an ambiguity that was the result of a compromise between civil and
common law countries. The provision states that "an offer cannot be
revoked... [i]f it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or
otherwise, that it is irrevocable." Therefore, the language of Article 16(2)(a)
is ambiguous as to whether an offer is revocable where it fixes a deadline for
acceptance but is otherwise silent on revocability. Under the law of common
law countries such as the U.S., such an offer would be found to be freely
revocable, whereas in civil law jurisdictions, fixing a time for acceptance
gives rise to the inference that the offer is irrevocable. 36 Accounts of the
Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of the CISG make clear that
the ambiguity in Article 16(2)(a) is a product of compromise. Delegates from
both the U.K. and Germany submitted proposals to clarify the effect of the
provision. The U.K. proposal sought to clarify that the fixing of a period for
acceptance would not in itself make an offer irrevocable, whereas the
German proposal sought a clarification to the opposite effect.37 Both
proposals were rejected, after which the German delegate commented that
the issue would be left to the courts to find a "reasonable common
interpretation" in difficult cases.38 However, to the extent that it would be
futile to adopt a "common" interpretation of an ambiguous treaty provision
resulting from a political compromise, Article 16(2)(a) should be interpreted
by reference to applicable domestic law rather than attempting to
compromise irreconcilable differences.
2. Exclusions from CISG Coverage
Another example of political compromise in the CISG is what is not
addressed by the Convention. There are some important substantive issues
that are not governed by the CISG, but rather are left to applicable domestic
law. Examples include statutes of limitation,39 procedural issues (such as
35 Gerhart, supra note 12, at 97-98.
36 Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 475.
37 Id. at 48 (citing DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 499).
38 Id. at 48-49 (citing DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 499-500).
39 Although the CISG has no provision dealing with statutes of limitation, or
limitation periods, the issue is addressed in a separate Convention. United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods, June 12, 1974, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 103-10, 1511 U.N.T.S.
199, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/1974Conventionlimitation
_period.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Limitation Convention]. The
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rules of evidence or discovery), any area that is subject to reservation by a
signatory state, 40 and perhaps most importantly, the validity of a contract.
Article 4(a) provides that the Convention does not govern "the validity of the
contract or of any of its provisions or any usage."'41 Thus, an argument that
the contract of sale was procured by fraud or duress would be determined by
applicable domestic law and not by the CISG.
Some commentators have argued for an "autonomous" interpretation of
Article 4(a)--that is, they have argued that the term "validity" should not be
determined by reference to domestic law. 42 According to this view, the
validity of a contract otherwise governed by the CISG should be decided by
reference to domestic law only where all, or at least a majority of states, treat
the issue as a question of domestic law.43 However, as Helen Hartnell argues,
such a construction of Article 4(a) would be at odds with its intended
purpose. The exact purpose of Article 4(a) is to allow applicable domestic
law to determine the politically sensitive issue of when a contract may be
voidable. By including Article 4(a) in the CISG, the drafters recognized that
the issue of contract validity can raise conflicting public policy concerns in
the countries that negotiated and drafted the Convention. 44 Therefore,
applicability of the Convention to this issue should be assessed, not only by
Limitation Convention was amended by protocol in 1980 and went into effect in 1988. It
provides for a four-year period. Limitation Convention, art. 8. Nineteen countries
(including the U.S.) are parties to the Limitation Convention as amended. United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Status: 1974-Convention on the Limitation
Period in the International Sale of Goods, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/1974Conventionstatus.htm
I (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
40 For example, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland declared, as permitted by
CISG Article 92, that they would not be bound by Part II of the Convention, which deals
with contract formation. Ten countries declared, as permitted by CISG Article 96, that
provisions in the Convention permitting a contract to be made in a form other than in
writing would not be applicable. United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Status: 1980-United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/salegoods/1980CISG_status.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Status of CISG]. Reservations are only permitted to the
extent expressly provided for in the CISG. CISG, supra note 1, art. 98.
41 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
42 Hartnell, supra note 27, at 48 (citing Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor
Kastely's Rhetorical Analysis, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 623, 637 (1988) and Peter
Schlechtriem, Unification of the Law for the International Sale of Goods, XIITH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (GERMAN NATIONAL REPORT) 121,
127 (1987)).
43 Hartnell, supra note 27, at 48.
44 See id. at 49.
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taking into consideration comparative practice, but by balancing it against
domestic public policy considerations.
3. Gap-Filling
An issue that was subject to extensive debate during the drafting of the
CISG was the role to be played by domestic law in filling gaps in the
Convention. The predecessor convention to the CISG (the ULIS) provided
that any gaps would be filled by reference to the "general principles"
underlying the Convention. This provision was vigorously criticized by
commentators, as well as by members of the UNCITRAL Working Group
that participated in the initial drafting of the CISG, for introducing an undue
degree of uncertainty into the interpretation of the ULIS.4 5 Critics argued that
gap-filling instead should be done through resort to domestic law.46 On the
other hand, supporters of the ULIS approach within the Working Group
argued that the use of domestic law for gap-filling would generate even
greater uncertainty and would subvert the goal of achieving uniformity. 47
The compromise that was eventually reached was Article 7(2), which
provides:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.48
In other words, Article 7(2) reiterates the ULIS concept of relying on
"general principles" but also provides for resort to domestic law when
general principles do not provide an answer. Although, as mentioned above,
some CISG experts have argued against the use of applicable domestic law to
interpret and fill gaps in the Convention, 49 resort to domestic law
(determined through conflicts rules) is exactly what is contemplated by
Article 7(2).
45 HONNOLD 1999 COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 103; see also Harold J. Berman,
The Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods: A Constructive Critique, 30 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 354, 362 (1965) (surmising that the general principles on which the
ULIS was based may be reasonableness and good faith, which "are often an inadequate
guide to the resolution of close questions of interpretation," especially in connection with
transnational disputes).
46 See HONNOLD, supra note 25, at 103; Berman, supra note 45, at 362.
47 HONNOLD, supra note 25, at 103.
48 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
49 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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As these examples illustrate, the parties who participated in the creation
of the CISG continuously compromised to ensure that the Convention would
be widely adopted. For this reason, Gerhart has argued that the CISG's
ultimate goal of achieving uniformity should be balanced against the interest
in ensuring the acceptability of the Convention over the long term.50 He
analogizes the CISG to a bridge, and suggests that "[i]nterpretation that
weakens faith in the bridge by the nations that supported its construction, or
that drives parties to resort to other regimes, will ultimately weaken the
bridge or render it useless." 51
In any event, even if it were true that the Convention unambiguously
called for an autonomous approach to interpreting the Convention at the
expense of other values-that is, interpreting the Convention in light of how
other countries have interpreted it, rather than resorting to domestic law
approaches-such an approach is fraught with difficulty. From the U.S.
perspective, such an approach requires access to English language
translations of foreign cases. Although some foreign CISG cases have been
translated into English and posted on the Internet,52 the translations vary in
quality. In addition, foreign case law is influenced by procedural rules and
legal culture that may be lost on the U.S. reader. Finally, many of the cases
that are available have not been fully translated into English but are based on
abstracts,53 which are selective in detail and fail to provide the full factual
context of the cases.54 Anthony Winer has also noted these difficulties and
concludes that insistence on uniform interpretation of the CISG has served to
undermine the Convention's coherence, and thus its legitimacy. 55 He
50 Gerhart, supra note 12, at 80.
51 Id. Gerhart identifies a number of "legitimacy values" that presumably guided the
drafters, including the interest in enabling countries to adopt the Convention as well as
ensuring that private parties utilize it. Id. at 87, 89-90.
52 See supra note 4.
53 See, e.g., the UNCITRAL's database of Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
(CLOUT), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/caselaw.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2007).
54 Just to provide one example, the CLOUT abstract for the OLG Hamm decision
(discussed infra at notes 105-08 and accompanying text) consists of three paragraphs,
and fails to make any mention of buyer's attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence or of the
court's rationale for ultimately rejecting such evidence. See UNCITRAL CLOUT
abstract no. 227, A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/caselaw/abstracts.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
55 See Winer, supra note 8, at 24. Winer invokes Thomas Franck's concept of
legitimacy with respect to a given international law rule, or the pull to compliance that a
rule may exert on actors in the international system. One of the characteristics of a
legitimate body of rules is coherence, or the rule's treatment of subjects according to
"some rational principle of broader application." Id. at 23 (citing Thomas Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 741 (1988)).
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contrasts the CISG with other international conventions that have
successfully harmonized international commercial law, without prohibiting
resort to domestic law principles to interpret or gap-fill. 56
This Essay considers these difficulties in the context of the CISG's rules
dealing with contract interpretation. It evaluates the manner in which MCC-
Marble interpreted the CISG's contract interpretation rules and suggests that
the decision, by attempting to adopt an autonomous interpretation of the
Convention, not only reached a result that may be unacceptable to U.S.
contracting parties, but also adopted an interpretation of the Convention that
does not necessarily reflect international practice. Before considering these
aspects of the MCC-Marble decision, the following section compares the
parol evidence rule (PER) of U.S. contract law with the Convention's
approach to contract interpretation.
B. CISG Approach to Extrinsic Evidence and the Writing Requirement
The issue of whether to admit extrinsic evidence to interpret or
supplement a written contract typically arises at the time of contract
enforcement, such as when a party tries to present evidence of prior
negotiations or other evidence of the parties' intent that is not reflected in the
writing. The rationale behind the PER is that the final written agreement
reflects the parties' understanding at the point of "maximum resolution." 57
Thus, the PER bars certain attempts to add to or contradict the writing after
the fact.
There are two distinct ways in which the PER limits the introduction of
extrinsic evidence. Under the U.C.C. version of the rule, if a written
agreement is final, the PER bars attempts to contradict the writing with any
prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement. If a written agreement
is found to be final, complete and exclusive ("completely integrated"), the
PER bars attempts to supplement the writing with evidence of consistent
additional terms. 58 The PER does not, however, bar the introduction of
56 Id. at 31. "Success" is defined by the extent to which the rule is regarded in
practice as binding. Id. at 30. The instruments that Winer contrasts with the CISG are the
Brussels Bill of Lading Convention, the Warsaw Air Transport Convention, and the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. Id. at 31.
57 The phrase is borrowed from MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 89 (4th ed. 2001).
58 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202 provides in full:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
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extrinsic evidence to interpret an agreement, although courts disagree over
whether the agreement must be facially ambiguous in order for the exception
to apply.59 Notwithstanding the fact that the PER has the effect of excluding
certain evidence, the PER is treated as a rule of substantive contract law and
not a rule of evidence. 60 Therefore, where a dispute is governed by the CISG,
the Convention does not displace the forum's procedural rules but it does
displace certain domestic rules of contract law, including, in cases otherwise
governed by U.S. domestic law, the PER.
In contrast to U.S. domestic law, the CISG adopts a liberal approach to
contract interpretation and rejects at least certain aspects of the PER. CISG
Article 8(3) provides that when interpreting a contract, a court or arbitrator
shall give "due consideration" to all relevant circumstances surrounding the
making of a contract, including any course of dealing between the parties,
trade usage, and prior negotiations. 61 Unlike the PER, Article 8(3) does not
(a) by course of dealing, or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (2004). Under U.C.C. § 2-202, evidence of course of performance, course
of dealing or trade usage is always admissible to supplement or interpret a writing, unless
the evidence cannot reasonably be construed consistently with the writing. U.C.C. §§ 1-
205(4), 2-208(2) (2004).
59 Compare, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) ("The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain
the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning
to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.") with Air Safety, Inc.
v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999) ("If the language of the
contract is facially unambiguous, then the contract is interpreted by the trial court as a
matter of law without the use of parol evidence.").
Even a court that adheres to the "plain meaning" rule should still admit trade usage,
course of dealing, and course of performance, regardless of facial ambiguity, if the
contract at issue is governed by U.C.C. Article 2. Under the U.C.C., evidence of trade
usage, course of dealing, and course of performance is always admissible to supplement
or interpret a writing, unless such evidence cannot be reasonably reconciled with the
writing. U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 1-205(4) (2004).
60 This is because the rule is not based on the idea that a given piece of evidence is
an unreliable method of proving a fact. The PER bars the showing of the fact itself. See,
e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.2 (3d ed. 1999).
61 CISG Article 8(3) provides in full: "In determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the
parties." CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
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set any express limit on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret a
contract, but instructs a court or arbitrator to give "due consideration" to such
evidence. Additionally, the Convention does not contain a Statute of Frauds,
permitting a contract to be proven "by any means," including through the use
of extrinsic evidence. 62
The documentary history to the Convention indicates that both Articles
8(3) and 11 were adopted over the objection of certain states represented at
the Diplomatic Conference. Interestingly, the early drafting history to Article
8(3) suggests that the provision was originally intended to be limited to
determining whether a contract had been concluded and was not intended to
regulate the interpretation of contracts more generally. Certain members of
the Working Party that prepared the initial draft of the Convention were of
the view that "rules on interpretation of contracts were too complex to be set
out adequately in the proposed Convention. '63 During the Diplomatic
Conference, the Swedish delegate (supported by delegates from Belgium and
the United Kingdom) proposed (unsuccessfully) to delete the article entirely,
explaining that discussion had revealed "wide differences of view" on the
issue of contract interpretation, and questioning whether it was necessary or
useful to establish new rules for the interpretation of contracts.64
62 CISG Article 11 provides in full: "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be
proved by any means, including witnesses." CISG, supra note 1, art 11.
To accommodate certain countries whose domestic law requires that an agreement
be in writing to be enforceable, Article 96 was added to the CISG, which allows a
signatory state to make a declaration that Article 11 will not apply where any party has
his place of business in that state. As of February 2006, ten countries had made such a
reservation, including Argentina, Belarus, Chile, China, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Paraguay, Russia and Ukraine. See UNCITRAL, Status: 1980-United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/1980CISG_status.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007).
63 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Report of
the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Ninth Session,
14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (Jan. 6, 1978), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 15, at 294.
The Secretariat Commentary to the Convention later made clear that the provision
was applicable, not only to contract formation issues, but to the interpretation of any
statement or conduct of a party falling under the Convention. The Secretariat,
Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979) [hereinafter Commentary on the Draft
Convention], reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 408.
64 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 63, at 262, reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 483. The committee voted against the
Swedish proposal.
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An unsuccessful attempt was also made at the Diplomatic Conference to
amend Article 11, which provides that an agreement of sale may be proved
by "any means, including witnesses." The Canadian delegate introduced a
proposal to add the following language to what is now Article 11:
Between the parties to a contract of sale evidenced by a written
document, evidence by witnesses shall be inadmissible for the purposes of
confuting or altering its terms, unless there is primafacie evidence resulting
from a written document from the opposing party, from his evidence or
from a fact the existence of which has been clearly demonstrated. However,
evidence by witnesses shall be admissible for purposes of interpreting the
written document. 65
In other words, the Canadian delegate sought to modify Article 11,
which otherwise does away with the writing requirement, by introducing a
limitation on admitting extrinsic evidence where the parties have chosen to
put their agreement in writing. The delegate explained in support of the
proposed amendment that "it was important to ensure a minimum of
protection" for parties who sought the certainty of a written contract.66 In
rejecting the Canadian proposal, other delegates criticized it as being overly
rigid, and suggested it was a restatement of the PER, a rule whose application
had been inconsistent even in common law countries.67 This piece of drafting
history has been cited to support the proposition that the CISG rejects the
PER. 68 However, it is worth noting that the proposal that was rejected was
not an amendment to Article 8 (which deals with contract interpretation) but
rather to Article 11 (which states that a contract of sale may be proved "by
any means"), an article to which ten of the CISG signatories made
reservations.69 More significantly, the response to the Canadian proposal
only suggests that the drafters rejected a per se rule barring the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence to prove a contract where the parties have adopted a
writing; it says nothing about the amount of consideration that should be
"due" to such extrinsic evidence under Article 8(3).
65 Id. at 90, reprinted in DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 662 (emphasis
in original).
66 Id. at 270, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 15, at 491 (emphasis
in original).
67 Id.
68 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning
Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, Oct. 23, 2004, at cmt. 2.3 (Rapporteur:
Richard Hyland), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CISG Advisory Council].
69 See supra note 62.
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Therefore, although it is clear that the delegates to the Diplomatic
Conference declined to include a parol evidence rule in the Convention, it is
by no means clear that the delegates rejected the proposition that the written
contract is to be given some weight. As elaborated in the following Part, the
court in MCC-Marble framed the question in the case simply as whether the
CISG "rejects the PER." Framing the issue in this way naturally led the court
to respond in the affirmative, thereby adopting an interpretation of Article
8(3) that may encourage future U.S. contracting parties to opt out of the
Convention.
III. MCCMARBLE DECISION
MCC-Marble has been touted by CISG scholars as a leading U.S.
decision on the Convention. One reason it has been so well received is
because the court endeavored to use an autonomous approach to interpreting
the Convention, citing a wealth of academic commentary in support of the
proposition that the CISG rejects the parol evidence rule. However, a closer
look at the underlying facts and the outcome of MCC-Marble reveals
troubling implications for contracting parties, particularly U.S. parties whose
agreements are governed by the Convention.
The parties to the case were MCC-Marble Ceramic, Inc. (MCC-Marble),
a Florida-based retailer of tiles, and Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino
(D'Agostino), an Italian tile manufacturer. 70 The two companies entered into
a contract for the sale of tile, which was negotiated and signed at a trade fair
in Milan. MCC-Marble was represented by its president, Juan Carlos
Monzon, and D'Agostino by its commercial director, Gianni Silingardi.
Since Monzon spoke no Italian and Silingardi no English, communications
between the parties were facilitated by a third party.71 Monzon and Silingardi
verbally agreed to the basic terms of the sales agreement, including the
quality and quantity of tile ordered, the purchase price, and the delivery and
payment terms, and recorded these terms on a purchase order form that was
prepared by D'Agostino. 72 The purchase order form, however, contained a
number of pre-printed terms on the back side. These terms included Clause 4,
which required complaints regarding any defects in the tile to be made by
certified letter within ten days of receipt, and Clause 6(b), which gave
D'Agostino the right to cancel the contract for failure to make timely
payment.73 On the front side of the form, just below the signature line
70 MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostina, S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384, 1385 (1 1th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1087 (1999).
71 Id.
72 See Brief of the Appellant at 8, MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d 1384 (No. 97-4250).
73 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1386.
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containing Monzon's signature, was printed language that read "[T]he buyer
hereby states that he is aware of the sales conditions stated on the reverse and
that he expressly approves of them with special reference to those numbered
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8." 74
A dispute between the parties later arose when MCC-Marble withheld
payment for tile, arguing that the tile delivered was not of the quality
specified in the contract. D'Agostino refused to deliver any further shipments
of tile, claiming that it was entitled to cancel the contract for nonpayment.
MCC-Marble filed suit in U.S. District Court, and D'Agostino cross-claimed
for damages. Liability turned on whether the printed terms on the back of the
purchase order formed part of the agreement. MCC-Marble argued that the
CISG applied to the contract and submitted affidavits of Monzon, the
translator, and Silingardi (who, according to D'Agostino, was a "disgruntled
former employee" of D'Agostino by the time of trial). 75 Each of the
affidavits stated that, although the parties had recorded the agreed price,
quantity, and other essential terms on a D'Agostino order form, the form
"was not intended to modify or supersede the parties' oral agreement. '7 6
Relying on CISG Article 8, MCC-Marble argued that the standard form
terms should not be read into the contract because, as the affidavits
demonstrated, neither it nor D'Agostino subjectively intended for the
standard form terms to become part of their agreement.77
A magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant summary
judgment to D'Agostino. The magistrate judge explicitly rejected MCC-
Marble's CISG argument: "Article 8 cannot be read to give binding effect to
a contracting party's intentions when they contradict the explicit and
unambiguous terms of a signed contract. To do so would render terms of
written contracts virtually meaningless and severely diminish the reliability
of commercial contracts." 78
After the district court granted summary judgment to D'Agostino, MCC-
Marble appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit opinion
framed the issue on appeal as whether the parol evidence rule "plays any role
in cases involving the CISG.' '79 After considering the language of Article
8(3) and academic commentary concluding that the CISG rejects the parol
74 Id. The original purchase order form was written in Italian. The court quoted the
language of the English translation provided by D'Agostino at trial. Id. at n.3.
75 Brief of the Appellee at 8, MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d 1384 (No. 97-4250).
76 Brief of the Appellant, supra note"72, at 8-9; see also Brief of the Appellee, supra
note 75, at 7-8 (describing the affidavits).
77 Brief of the Appbllant, supra note 72, at 6.
78 Id.
79 MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1388.
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evidence rule,80 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. Although the court acknowledged that a reasonable fact
finder could disregard the affidavits submitted by MCC-Marble as "simply
too incredible to believe," it found the affidavits raised a material issue of
fact as to the proper interpretation of the agreement. 81
MCC-Marble is an influential U.S. decision. As already stated,82 it has
been cited as a leading decision on the CISG by international authorities on
the Convention, and even has been included in a number of U.S. contract law
casebooks. 83 MCC-Marble has been followed by several U.S. courts, 84 most
notably in the case Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft
Service AB. 85 In Mitchell Aircraft, the court relied on MCC-Marble to find
there was a question of fact sufficient to deny summary judgment over
whether a written contract for the sale of aircraft parts numbered "729640"
could have been intended by the parties to refer to aircraft parts numbered
"708254."86
80 The court stated that its "reading of article 8(3) as a rejection of the parol
evidence rule ... is in accordance with the great weight of academic commentary on the
issue." Id. at 1390 (citing, among others, John Honnold, Herbert Bernstein & Joseph
Lookofsky, Harry Fletchner, and Peter Winship).
81 Id. at 1391-92.
82 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (citing the praise of Fletchner and
the CISG advisory council).
83 See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE,
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 405-06 (5th ed. 2003); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 566-67 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001); EDWARD J. MURPHY,
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 630-31 (6th ed. 2003);
JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 14 (4th ed. 2004).
84 Shuttle Packaging Sys., L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, S.A., 2001 WL 34046276 at *8 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) (citing MCC-Marble for the idea that agreements under the CISG
"are not subject to the parol evidence rule and are to be interpreted based on the
'subjective intent' of the parties based on their prior and subsequent statements and
conduct"); Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 2001 WL
1000927 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2001) (citing MCC-Marble for the idea that the CISG
"mandate[s] universality rather than a purely home-town rule"). The award of attorneys'
fees in Zapata Hermanos ultimately was reversed on appeal. See Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002).
85 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
86 Id. at 919-20. The contract at issue in Mitchell Aircraft involved the sale by a
Swedish seller to an Illinois-based buyer of three integrated drive generators (IDGs), or
parts for the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar, a jet airliner that went out of production in 1984.
Id. at 916-17. Admittedly, extrinsic evidence might have been admissible in the case
even if the court had applied Illinois common law, as the contract arguably was
ambiguous as to whether the objects of sale were aircraft parts numbered "729640" or the
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In contrast to earlier U.S. decisions applying the CISG, 87 MCC-Marble
endeavored to adopt an interpretation of Article 8(3) that complied with
Article 7(2)'s instruction to interpret the CISG with regard to "the need to
promote uniformity in its application." As such, the court found that Article
8(3) required that the affidavits submitted by MCC-Marble had to be given
"due consideration," thereby defeating D'Agostino's summary judgment
motion. However, this interpretation of Article 8(3) not only heightens the
uncertainty generated by a novel rule, it also interprets the Convention in a
way that may prove to be unacceptable to U.S. contracting parties.8 8 MCC-
Marble ensures that, with respect to contracts governed by the CISG,
summary judgment will be denied so long as the other party introduces any
evidence alleging that the writing is not what it appears to be. Thus, MCC-
Marble's approach may exacerbate the tendency of U.S. parties to opt out of
the Convention.
Indeed, a group of New York lawyers recently raised these very concerns
regarding MCC-Marble to a group of CISG experts. The CISG Advisory
Council is an international group of CISG academics that organized in 2001
to promote and assist the uniform interpretation of the Convention.89 The
Foreign and Comparative Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York recently submitted to the Council a request for an
opinion on whether, inter alia, the parol evidence rule applies under the
CISG. In its written request, the bar committee suggested that MCC-Marble
introduced into contract drafting "what may be an unnecessary degree of
uncertainty," 90 noting that under such an approach, "there is no certainty that
the provisions of even the most carefully negotiated and drafted contract will
be determinative." 91 The CISG Advisory Council responded with a written
opinion emphasizing that neither the PER nor the plain meaning rule applies
aircraft parts that the seller had on hand. Id. at 921. However, the opinion's treatment of
MCC-Marble and CISG Article 8 suggests that summary judgment would have been
denied even if the contract unambiguously called for the sale of aircraft part "729640."
Id. at 919-21.
87 See, e.g., Beijing Metals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1182 n.9 (5th Cir.
1993) (stating, without further analysis, that, regardless of whether the CISG or Texas
law governed the dispute, the PER would still be applicable).
88 For a discussion of novelty risk, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
I am not arguing that the MCC-Marble court should have applied U.S. domestic law.
In fact, the contract at issue in MCC-Marble may well have been governed by Italian and
not U.S. law, since the contract was concluded in Italy and involved an Italian seller.
Rather, I argue for a different interpretation of CISG Article 8(3), one that is more
consistent with U.S. domestic law but that is also consistent with international practice, as
explained in Part IV below.
89 CISG Advisory Council, supra note 68, at n. 1.




under the CISG,92 and cited MCC-Marble as "[t]he leading US case" on this
issue.93 The opinion also observed that parties are free to derogate from any
of the CISG's provisions, including those relating to norms of
interpretation. 94 Hence, the Advisory Council opinion not only endorsed
MCC-Marble, but it also invited U.S. contracting parties who seek to avoid
the uncertainty generated by the decision to opt out of the Convention's
provisions.
As mentioned above, what was at stake in MCC-Marble was whether
there was an issue of fact sufficient to mandate a trial. MCC-Marble's
approach to contract interpretation is particularly burdensome for litigants
under U.S. rules of procedure, since the outcome of the litigation may hinge
on whether a party's motion for summary judgment is granted. The stakes are
not the same for litigants operating under rules of procedure in other
countries, as explained below.
The expanded availability of summary judgment in the U.S. in recent
years can be explained in part by the pressing need to avoid the costs (both
financial and otherwise) inherent in going to trial. In the colorful words of
Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud:
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our
system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of
resolving disputes, but a disfavored one.... Much of our civil procedure is
justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More
important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to
avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial .... 95
In fact, a very high percentage of litigated disputes in the U.S.-between
85 and 95 percent--do not go to trial, either because the parties settle the
dispute or because the dispute is disposed of in some other way, such as by
92 Id. at cmts. 2, 3.
93 Id. at cmt. 2.6.
94 Id. at cmt. 4. The opinion also observes that extrinsic evidence would be
admissible to determine the parties' intent with respect to any such opt-out clause. CISG
Advisory Council, supra note 68, at cmt. 4.5.
Some commentators have questioned whether a standard merger clause would be
sufficient to derogate from CISG Article 8(3). See William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG
in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 89 (2000) (explaining that under the CISG, "there is
no parol evidence rule for a merger clause to invoke"); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 84 at 454 (4th ed. 2001) (advising that parties wishing to
derogate from Article 8(3) should include in any merger clause an express statement to
that effect). In addition, the enforceability of a merger clause on unconscionability or
other grounds would be determined by international law pursuant to CISG Article 4(a).
95 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 320 (1991).
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arbitration or dismissal.96 In other words, the denial of a summary judgment
motion in the vast majority of cases will set the parameters for the parties'
settlement of the dispute.
In civil law jurisdictions, in contrast, proceedings are not sharply
delineated between pre-trial and trial practice. 97 German trial practice in
particular has been characterized as relatively informal, flexible and
"discontinuous." 98 From the initiation of proceedings until final judgment,
proceedings in German courts may occur in a series of episodic sessions
where oral argument is interspersed with fact-finding, with the court entering
intermediate judgments to dispose of issues as they arise. 99 And in contrast to
the adversarial, party-driven nature of U.S. trial practice, in civil law
jurisdictions the judge takes on the central role in investigating the facts of
the case. 100 In other words, there is nothing comparable to a summary
judgment motion in German civil trial practice. These differences, plus the
general absence of juries in civil cases, 10 1 explain why civil law jurisdictions
have little need for rules, such as the PER, that limit the admissibility of
evidence to prove a commercial contract.102
96 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1994).
97 For a discussion of the general differences between civil and common law
systems in this regard, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76
TEx. L. REv. 1665, 1672-74 (1998); Edward F. Sherman, The Evolution of American
Civil Trial Process Towards Greater Congruence with Continental Trial Practice, 7 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125, 128 (1999); Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of
Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 839, 840-41 (1997).
98 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 609, 609 (1988); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren
& Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure 1, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1211-
12 (1958).
99 Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, supra note 98, at 1211-12.
100 Hazard, supra note 97, at 1672-73; Damaska, supra note 97, at 843-44.
Damaska explains that in most European civil law countries, the judge controls the
examination of witnesses and appoints experts. Id. at 844. Parties' counsel are not
involved in fact investigation, do not examine or cross-examine witnesses, and rely
primarily on the proof supplied by their clients in presenting arguments to the court. Id
101 See Hazard, supra note 97, at 1674 (explaining that, other than the U.S., "[n]o
other country routinely uses juries in civil cases").
102 Although the French Civil Code has a version of the PER for non-merchant
contracts, there is no PER under the law of most civil law countries, including Germany,




To summarize, MCC-Marble held that, because the CISG requires a
court to consider all extrinsic evidence surrounding the making of a contract,
affidavits to the effect that the parties never intended for the pre-printed
terms to form part of their contract raised an issue of fact sufficient to deny a
summary judgment motion in favor of D'Agostino. While under German law
the admissibility of such evidence would have a relatively limited impact on
the proceedings, under the U.S. system denial of summary judgment would
have a significantly greater impact. The following section argues in favor of
an alternate interpretation of Article 8(3), one that is informed by
international commentary on the CISG and by a number of German
decisions.
IV. PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF CISG ARTICLE 8(3)
What is particularly notable about MCC-Marble is that, in rejecting out
of hand the applicability of the PER in cases governed by the CISG, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted an interpretation of CISG Article 8(3) that affords
less deference to a final written contract than the text of the rule requires. 103
A more conservative interpretation of CISG Article 8(3) would not have been
inconsistent with international practice and might have changed the outcome
of the case. Recall that CISG Article 8(3) instructs a court or tribunal to give
"due consideration" to extrinsic evidence in interpreting a contract. Several
of the leading commentators on the CISG have noted that, while CISG
Article 8(3) requires courts and tribunals to consider extrinsic evidence, "due
consideration" nonetheless allows a court to weigh the evidence against a
presumption that the final written contract is accurate and complete.'°4
103 The Eleventh Circuit's approach may have been influenced by the arguments
presented on appeal. Counsel for D'Agostino, relying on the much-criticized Beiing
Metals decision, argued that the PER applies "regardless" of whether the contract at issue
is governed by the CISG. Brief of the Appellee, supra note 75, at 13-14 (citing Beijing
Metals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1182 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993)).
10 4 HERBERT BERNSTEIN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN
EUROPE 78-79 (2d ed. 2003); see also HONNOLD 1999 COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at
121 ("Jurists interpreting agreements subject to the Convention can be expected to
continue to give special and, in most cases, controlling effect to detailed written
agreements."); COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 88 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2d ed. 1998) (stating CISG Articles 8(3) and
11 do not "preclude the existence of a 'preference' for evidence of declarations in written
form").
Interestingly, a subsequent edition of the Schlechtriem treatise adopts a more
equivocal position on this issue:
Articles 8 and 11 call into question corresponding concepts of other legal systems,
such as the German presumption of accuracy and completeness. As a rule of law this
can only apply under the Convention to the extent it is found in Article 8. The fact
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German courts applying the CISG have relied on a presumption in favor
of the accuracy and completeness of a written contract as a basis for rejecting
certain extrinsic evidence, after giving such evidence "due consideration" as
required under Article 8(3). One such case was decided by the
Oberlandesgericht Hamm in September 1992.105 The case involved an Italian
seller and a German buyer that entered into a contract for the sale of frozen
bacon to be delivered in installments. The contract was formed through the
exchange of letters between representatives of buyer and seller. Although the
German buyer's letter requested that the bacon be packaged in polyethylene
bags, the Italian seller's reply letter rejected the packaging request. Buyer
accepted seller's counteroffer in a fax that expressly referenced the terms set
forth in seller's reply letter. After several installments of bacon were
delivered and paid for, buyer refused to take delivery of the remaining
installments and seller brought suit in German court to recover damages.
Buyer's defense was that the agreement was subject to an express condition:
due to buyer's concerns about the unpackaged condition of the bacon, the
parties verbally agreed that each installment would be subject to the previous
installment not being rejected by health and customs authorities. Buyer
submitted witness testimony to support its interpretation of the contract.
However, the court rejected buyer's argument, basing its decision on the
presumption that the documents that led to the formation of the contract were
complete and correct. 106 The witness testimony that buyer produced was
insufficient to overcome the presumption of an unconditional contract based
on the writing. The court observed that it was of decisive importance that
buyer had accepted seller's terms with a fax that referenced seller's letter
without reservation or mention of any agreed-upon condition. 10 7 OLG Hamm
illustrates how CISG Article 8(3) may be construed to allow a court or
that the presumption is rebuttable speaks for compatibility with the Convention ....
Nevertheless, such a preference for written statements cannot be inferred from
Articles 8 and 11 ....
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG)
126 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d English ed. 2006). As referenced
in the above-quoted text, under German law courts and arbitrators employ a presumption
in favor of the correctness and completeness of a writing. Id.
105 Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 19U 97/91, Sept. 22, 1992, full German text available
in UNILEX: INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW & BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, (English translation available on
file with author) [hereinafter OLG Hamm].
An abstract of the decision is available online at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/caselaw/abstracts.html (CLOUT Abstract no. 227)
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
106 As stated in the German text, "die Vermutung der Vollstandigkeit und




tribunal to consider but ultimately reject extrinsic evidence that cannot be
reconciled with the terms of a final writing.108
Of course, OLG Hamm was decided by a German court where, as
discussed earlier, 10 9 rules of civil procedure allow the court to consider
evidence and question witnesses as the issues arise. The issue from a U.S.
procedural perspective, in contrast, would be whether the extrinsic evidence
raised an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.I 10 Nonetheless, the modem U.S. standard for summary judgment
is sufficiently relaxed that one could imagine a different outcome in MCC-
Marble-one upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of D'Agostino-had the court employed an interpretation of CISG
Article 8(3) that afforded greater weight to the final writing."I' If the writing
108 For another example of a German decision involving facts somewhat similar to
MCC-Marble, see Oberlandsgericht Saarbriacken, Jan. 13, 1993, full German text
available in UNILEX: INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW & BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, no. 1 U 69/92
(English translation available on file with author) [hereinafter OLG Saarbruicken].
OLG Saarbrficken involved a contract for the sale of doors between a French seller
and a German buyer, which contract buyer claimed had been breached due to delivery of
non-conforming goods. The issue in the case was whether buyer had given timely notice
of lack of conformity of the goods as required under CISG Articles 38 and 39. Buyer
claimed that under prevailing trade usage, it would be unusual for buyers to examine the
delivered goods within a very short timeframe. In rejecting buyer's argument, the court
noted that one of the terms and conditions of sale printed on the back of seller's
confirmation form (item no. 5) required that buyer give notice of any complaints relating
to the quality of the goods within eight days of delivery. The court noted that the
existence of item no. 5 in the written terms and conditions weighed in favor of finding
that the parties intended to deviate from the alleged trade usage. See id.
109 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
110 Of course, the procedural posture would change if the parties had submitted their
dispute to arbitration.
111 The "trilogy" of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 significantly
expanded the availability of summary judgment. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), a huge, complex antitrust case involving
conspiracy charges against a group of Japanese manufacturers, the Court found that if the
factual context makes plaintiffs' conspiracy charges "implausible," then plaintiffs must
produce "more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be
necessary" to defeat a summary judgment motion. Id. at 587. The Court concluded that,
"in light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire," the alleged conduct by
defendants did not give rise to a reasonable inference of conspiracy and therefore was
insufficient to create a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 597; see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (in determining whether a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented, "[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient"); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317 (1986). A thorough discussion of these Supreme
Court decisions and how they have affected the availability of summary judgment in the
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had been given greater weight, the MCC-Marble court may well have found
that the affidavits submitted did not raise a material issue of fact in that they
could not be reasonably reconciled with the contract's express terms. 112
To summarize, while it is clear that the CISG rejects certain aspects of
the U.S. approach to contract interpretation and the PER, it is much less clear
how much "consideration" extrinsic evidence is "due" when interpreting ,a
contract under Article 8(3). This essay argues for an interpretation of Article
8(3) that affords greater weight to the final writing than was allowed in
MCC-Marble. The preceding discussion explains that such an approach
would be more palatable to U.S. contracting parties, and is consistent with
the approach followed in at least one other CISG jurisdiction (Germany).
Although the German cases cited herein could be criticized as reflecting
domestic law influence rather than endeavoring to adopt an autonomous
reading of Article 8(3), an interpretation that is informed by national
approaches may enhance the long-term legitimacy of the Convention.
lower courts is presented in Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 84-94 (1990); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment,
Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99 (1988)
(suggesting that in issuing the three decisions that make up the trilogy, the Court
"effectively rewrote" the summary judgment rule).
The implication for contract interpretation cases is that, under the modem standard,
summary judgment may be appropriate even if a contract is sufficiently ambiguous to
permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence. See Joseph D. Becker, Disambiguating
Contracts by Summary Judgment, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 10 (Dec. 1997). Becker concludes
that, under the modem approach to, summary judgment, the mere existence of ambiguity
in a contract "does not itself preclude summary judgment," since extrinsic evidence may
be admitted and considered without necessarily raising a material issue of fact. Id. at 14.
112 Note that the interpretation of Article 8(3) proposed herein is somewhat
analogous to the liberal approach to contract interpretation under U.S. law, which was
exemplified by Justice Traynor's opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968), and endorsed by the Restatement
Second. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 cmt. b ("Even though words
seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear
when the circumstances are disclosed."). Under such an approach, a court or arbitrator
should consider the extrinsic evidence and exclude it only if the evidence does not
support an interpretation to which the language of the written contract is reasonably
susceptible. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644. In contrast, the "plain meaning" approach to
contract interpretation that is followed by some U.S. courts cannot be used as a basis for
interpreting the meaning of "due consideration" in CISG Article 8(3), since it precludes a
court from giving any consideration to extrinsic evidence when a contract is




This Essay has argued against the result in MCC-Marble and in favor of
a less autonomous interpretation of the CISG. Of course, one could argue
that sacrificing the goal of uniform interpretation to other values ultimately
defeats the purpose of adopting a uniform law. To put the issue another way,
is a CISG that is subject to non-uniform interpretations worse than having no
CISG at all? Is the CISG project, like Esperanto, a utopian but ultimately
futile attempt at harmonization?
Commentators have suggested that harmonization through the adoption
of international rules is futile, and that any uniform law drafting process is
inherently inefficient because it will not result in the type of law that
commercial parties themselves would have chosen.'1 3 In my view, such
predictions of the irrelevance or ultimate demise of the CISG are premature.
Most of the U.S. cases that refer to the CISG have been decided in the past
few years. 114 Over time, as the CISG increasingly is taught in U.S. law
schools and more attorneys become familiar with the Convention, the novelty
of the CISG will abate. In addition, I think that a uniform law that is flawed
and subject to varied interpretations is preferable to a complete lack of a
uniform law. As John Honnold noted in 1965 (referring to the then-recently
adopted ULIS and ULF):
Surely even those who were most disappointed in some of the provisions of
these Uniform Laws must recognize that they would improve the sorry legal
situation confronting trade, which must cope with national laws antique and
unsuited to international transactions, unintelligible to traders from different
legal and linguistic backgrounds, and subject to the vagaries of the conflict
of laws. 115
From this perspective, the CISG offers potential advantages to parties
negotiating a transnational sales agreement. From a psychological
perspective, the CISG provides a common frame of reference around which
to negotiate the contract, which should result in lower transaction costs for
the parties."16 Although the CISG does not completely do away with the
"vagaries" of conflicts rules (as there are matters that the CISG does not
113 See Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 485 (predicting the CISG ultimately will
lose out to domestic law systems that provide more desirable substantive rules to
contracting parties).
114 See supra note 7.
115 1964 Convention, supra note 24, at 331-32.
116 See Filip De Ly, The Relevance of the Vienna Convention for International Sales
Contracts-Should We Stop Contracting It Out?, 3 Bus. L. INT'L 241, 246 (2003) (listing
cross-cultural, transaction cost, and contract management advantages of the CISG).
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address that are to be covered under applicable domestic law), the existence
of a uniform convention nonetheless narrows the scope of issues that are
subject to conflicts rules. These same advantages could also be obtained by
resorting to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts,' 1 7 another set of uniform rules applicable to transnational sales
contracts. However, unlike the CISG, the UNIDROIT principles do not apply
by default to a contract, but instead represent international commercial
principles that parties can expressly opt into. As such, one would suppose
(and existing case law suggests) that the UNIDROIT principles are even less
familiar to U.S. attorneys and judges than the CISG. 118
In sum, the CISG is not a futile effort. The prospects of the CISG's
continued acceptance, however, will be enhanced if courts are allowed
greater leeway to interpret the CISG in light of domestic legal traditions.
117 See supra note 21.
118 A search of the term "UNIDROIT" in the "allcases" database of Westlaw on
April 28, 2006 located only a single case that referred to the UNIDROIT Principles. The
case involved a request to confirm a foreign arbitral award that had applied the
UNIDROIT Principles. See Ministry of Def. and Support for the Armed Forces of the
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
[Vol. 68:133
